It is a type of synthetic organism called mirror life, in which the constituent molecules are mirror images of natural life. It can pose unprecedented risks to human life and ecosystems.According to articles from the perspectives of leading experts, including Nobel Prize winners. Article published in science December 12th is with a long report Detail their concerns.
Mirror life is related to the omnipresent phenomenon in nature, where no molecule or other object can simply be superimposed on another. For example, you cannot simply flip your left hand over to match your right hand. These hand shapes can be found throughout the natural world.
Groups of molecules of the same type tend to have the same orientation. For example, the nucleotides that make up DNA are almost always oriented to the right, while proteins are made up of amino acids that are oriented to the left.
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Handling, more formally known as chirality, is of great importance in biology. This is because interactions between biomolecules depend on them having the expected shape. For example, if a protein changes orientation, it cannot interact with a partner molecule, such as a cell’s receptor. “Think of it like putting a glove on your hand,” said Katarzyna Adamala, a synthetic biologist at the University of Minnesota and co-author of the nearly 300-page article and accompanying technical report. “My left glove doesn’t fit my right hand.”
The authors are concerned about the simplest life forms to which their interest applies: mirror bacteria. The ability to create mirror bacteria does not yet exist and will “take at least a decade,” they write, but progress is being made. Researchers can already synthesize mirror biomolecules such as DNA and proteins. At the same time, progress has been made toward generating synthetic cells from non-mirrored components. In 2010, researchers at the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI) in California installed synthetic DNA into cells to First cell with fully synthesized genome.
Creating a mirror-like life requires more innovation, but it can be achieved with significant investment and effort. “We are not relying on scientific breakthroughs that may never happen. “I can draw you a list of things that need to happen to create mirror cells,” says Adamala. “It’s not science fiction anymore.” Adamala has previously worked to create mirror cells, but now fears that if mirror bacteria are created, the consequences could include irreversible ecological damage and loss of life. The article’s authors – experts in immunology, synthetic biology, plant pathology, evolutionary biology and ecology, as well as two Nobel Prize winners – discuss the best path forward for researchers, policy makers, regulators and society as a whole. I urge you to get started. Understand and mitigate the risks identified by the author. Unless there is evidence that a mirror life will occur. ~ no We advise against conducting research aimed at creating mirror bacteria, as this poses special risks.
The initial passion to create mirror versions of bacteria began with simple imagination. Researchers have considered the possibility of working with mirror versions of proteins and other molecules. proteins and other molecules It is a component of such organisms. One example is a drug that must be periodically re-administered because its molecules are broken down during biological processes. Mirror versions of biological molecules do not interact with these molecular mechanisms, so drugs made from mirror molecules may have longer-lasting effects. .
Many immune system mechanisms also rely on the use of hands. For example, T cells, which are responsible for recognizing foreign invaders, may fail to bind to something if used incorrectly. Therefore, these treatments may avoid triggering an immune response in patients. “Mirror peptides may be useful as therapeutics because they do not degrade easily,” says co-author John Glass, a synthetic biologist at JCVI. “We see absolutely no reason to ban this.”
Potential applications of mirrors bacteria This can be a bioreactor, a biological factory that uses cells or microorganisms to manufacture various compounds such as antibiotics and other pharmaceuticals. Bacteriophages (viruses that infect bacteria) can eliminate bacteria-based bioreactors, costing a great deal of time and money, but mirror bacteria are unlikely to infect because they do not recognize their own molecules. Likewise, natural predators such as amoebas that consume regular bacteria do not recognize mirror bacteria as food.
It is these beneficial properties that have raised scientists’ concerns. “All the practical applications that brought us into this field are why we’re scared now,” says Adamala. The ability to evade the immune response allows bacteria to grow unchecked and cause fatal infections. Unlike viruses, bacteria do not need to interact with specific molecules to infect an organism, and mirror bacteria can infect a wide range of hosts, including humans, other animals, and plants. And a lack of predators can allow mirror bacteria to spread widely through an ecosystem.
Although many authors initially thought that mirror bacteria would not survive outside the laboratory because of a lack of mirror nutrients, the report concluded that there were enough nutrients to feed mirror bacteria to sustain them. The researchers discuss possible biosecurity measures, such as developing mirror phage viruses that can infect and kill mirror bacteria, but conclude that this is unlikely to be sufficient protection. “nothing [authors] “We have been able to come up with measures that we believe are effective enough to protect the biosphere from these organisms,” says Glass.
Not everyone agrees that mirror bacteria pose such a great risk. “I would argue that mirror-image bacteria would be at a huge competitive disadvantage and would not survive very well,” says Andrew Ellington, a molecular biologist at the University of Texas at Austin who develops synthetic organisms. He is not convinced that it is appropriate to sound the alarm long before a threat occurs, or even before the technology exists that can be used to directly create the threat. “It’s like banning transistors because you’re worried about cybercrime 30 years from now,” says Ellington. He also worries that governments and regulators may not respond as the authors had hoped, hindering potentially fruitful research. “I’m not particularly worried about the threat of little-known things 30 years from now compared to the good we can do now,” he says.
Although the exact risks may be uncertain, is What is certain is that any threat remains remote. “It’s difficult to say what the risk scenario is because the technology is not yet developed, but this paper can start that discussion,” said Sarah Carter, a California-based science policy biosafety consultant and former JCVI policy analyst who studies biosecurity and policy implications. “He says. of emerging biotechnology. “So I applaud this group for looking to the future and focusing their attention on this.
