Interview -David Galbreath

David J. Galbreath is a war and technical professor in the political, language and international research of Bath University. His research focuses on how technology is to form and form a war. He is also studying with the Russian and Ukrainian wars that resurrected Europe’s security in the European military and the Atlantic crossing. His current study is about digital innovation informing us of the future war. He was an editor European security (2008-2015), Defense (2014-2016) and The Associate Editor European International Security Journal (2016-2020). He is a co -editor (with US Army War College, John Deni). Routledge Handbook of Defense Research (2019). With Aaron Brally (Virginia Tech) and Manabrata Guha (Australian National University), he is co -edited. Routledge Handbook on War and Technology (emergence).

Where is the most interesting research/discussion in this field?

The understanding of the relationship with technology is to understand and I think that much of the literature of environmental philosophy is one way to conceptualize it and probably try to understand it. I understand that human experience will be important in the future, which understands that international relations are understood as including external or previous ones.

How has the way to understand the world has changed over time, and what is the most important change in your thoughts (or who)?

My understanding of the world has continued to change time, space and decisions to small bits.Pure war‘. But I think it’s a meeting with Ruth Miller. SNARL: Defense a stagnant traffic and a defective networkAt first, I first noticed other ways to understand international relations beyond policies, agents and institutions. Miller means that you can’t think about our external networks means that the network always fails. I see this always repeated in the IR.

Can President Trump’s approach to pressure and coercion use be more effective than traditional diplomacy? How can this affect long -term stability in the same region as Ukraine?

I think this is a rod. The Trump administration can do what others could not do, but this is not as if Trump asked if the Biden administration worked but could not do it. Trump as a negotiator was always trading and power -oriented. I do not think we should see this as not part of traditional diplomacy. Beyond the narrowly defined idea of ​​what the United States can get from peace negotiations, I am not sure if Trump and Viden can be considered together. They have a different understanding of how the world should work and work.

How do you see the balance of economic interests and designated scientific goals in forming global work because countries like China and India continue to trade with Russia?

We have never seen time in international relations where economic interests and designated scientific goals have not formed global work. See how the United States has militaryized the national economy with the national interest in the Cold War. China and India continue to trade with Russia because Ukraine can be seen as related to its national security or interests. In Beijing and Delhi, there was a slight desire for the United States to continue to find Ukraine with its own national interests, but the change begins with the Trump administration that Ukraine and Europe are not in the US national interests. So I argue that China and India with Russia are as usual and are not a big change in international relations.

You discuss the concept of “Free Rudding” in NATOThe United States has an unbalanced rate for alliance’s defense costs. Have European countries rely too much in the United States or have a reasonable contract depending on the situation?

The European government’s freedom of US power can be seen in two ways. The first is that the European government has a small territorial security, but it requires overall security, so it is reasonably determined that the defense can be spent at the ratio of GDP. US troops are like insurance.

The second way to think about it is the American Empire. Michael Cox talked about it in 2004. International research review article. The European government was caught in the United States while being regarded as a loyal part of the empire during international relations. As long as the ‘principle’ of the empire thinks that the empire acts on them, the controlled agent will benefit the empire’s security and defense without mentioning trade and shared value. But once the principle begins to think that the empire is not working for them, agents take the effort to show value to the empire while the empire products are no longer available. Either way, the European government is in a difficult position.

You make an event The United States is currently focusing on responding to China rather than defending Europe. How do you think this recycling will affect global security for small countries that depend on the world’s security, especially for protection?

The classic challenge of realism in a state without power is whether it will be balanced or balanced. If we think these are the only two options, small European countries must pursue evil trucks on the power of the larger European countries, even if they set drifting at the end of the Atlantic Crossing Security Community. Before this happens, the large and small European governments will try to reassure the Trump administration that the interests of the US state are served through the European bogie. If this is not successful, we will see the development of the European Security Treaty Organization to collect large and small states to recreate multinational forces similar to NATO’s many structures and standard operation procedures.

With European leaders considering increasing support for UkraineWhat is the problem with the EU’s balance of the risk of additional escalations with Russia and security interests?

The EU rarely needs to worry in terms of Russia. First, Europe’s support for Ukraine is greatly both between individual EU or NATO member states and Ukraine. The second is that the UK and Norway remain outside the EU, a NATO member country. Therefore, it is possible to create a completely new security treaty, including all European NATO member states. Naturally, one of the key aspects that this misses is the future of Canada in the treaty that the United States must withdraw its NATO or change the treaty to remove NATO’s clause. Either way, I don’t think the EU will be a focus of Russia’s concern, but rather everything after NATO.

Is the backstop of the United States to guarantee Europe’s security in the long run, or is Europe developing its own defense ability?

European soldiers do not have a weapon system needed to punish Ukrainian Russia in the same way as American weapons and systems. The Europeans provided Ukraine more in terms of origin and weapons, but the United States had an overwhelming influence of Ukraine and Russia. Americans have provided much sharper weapons than Europeans. This means that the future defensive alliance in Europe must develop a similar weapon system, or later, it is difficult to imagine before 2040.

For example, take an example of British’s ‘Future Fire’ program, which wants to find an artillery weapon system in 2040. Instead, the British agreed to the current RCH 155, but the British army variants will be different. Despite the best efforts of the British troops, we need to present a new budget line for future fires in 2040. Investment in the future is difficult when investment in defense collapses to escape the main operations of previous Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. And this can be applied to all European military.

What is the prospect of in -depth integration of European defense forces? Can a unified European army better solve emerging threats such as cyber wars and instability?