Intro. [Recording date: August 8, 2024.]
Russ Roberts: Today is August 8th, 2024. My guest is military strategist, journalist, and former soldier, Andrew Fox. He writes on Substack; his site is simply called Andrew Fox’s Substack.
For 16 years, he was an infantry officer. He twice commanded an infantry platoon in Afghanistan and a fire support group in the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. He commanded training platoons at the Royal Military Sandhurst, which is the British West Point, although Andrew would probably say West Point is the British Sandhurst. He wrote the syllabus from which all British Army officers are still taught how to plan military operations, and he served with the Green Berets in Afghanistan. There’s more, but I think you get the idea that Andrew has seen a few things.
Andrew, welcome to EconTalk.
Andrew Fox: Thank you very much. Great to be here.
Russ Roberts: Before we start, I want to mention: This episode may involve some adult themes. Parents listening with children may want to screen it accordingly.
I also want to remind listeners: I’ve done about a dozen episodes on the war in Gaza, and on Israel generally, since October 7th. Some people I’ve interviewed are very pro-Israel; some less so, are highly critical of Israel. My goal has always been to try to understand what’s going on. I know I have biases. I know it’s a very emotional issue for many of you, and for me. A number of you aren’t listening anymore. You’ve sent me some really lovely hate mail. That’s okay. I hope those of you who are still listening are, like me: you come to this issue with your own biases, but you’re eager to learn more.
I’ll add, we’re recording this while Israel waits for a possible attack from Iran in the aftermath of the recent killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Going to bed every night for the last week or so, waiting to hear air raid sirens, certainly colors my perception of reality, and I understand those perceptions may not be the same as yours.
The reason I’ve invited Andrew Fox is that he has been on the ground in Gaza recently with the Israeli army–the IDF, the Israel Defense Force–and has been and in Rafah and seen what’s going on. He has great respect for the IDF, but he has also been very critical at times when appropriate, which is why I’m hoping to learn something from him.
Russ Roberts: Okay. Andrew, let’s start with what you were able to observe in Gaza–how much freedom you were given, who were you allowed to speak with, how much time did you spend there, and really, what was the nature of what you were doing there.
Andrew Fox: I spent a full week with the IDF, but only one day of that was in Gaza. So, I was the rapporteur for the high-level military group who just submitted an amicus curiae–a Friend-of-the-Court brief–to the ICC [International Criminal Court], in regards to the potential arrest warrants against Mr. Gallant and Mr. Netanyahu.
The access we had all week was quite remarkable, and they were very open and frank with us–which impressed me actually, because we asked them some tough questions and they were happy to take them on the chin. Obviously, they weren’t going to show us everything, but I think we had enough military experience in the group. It was a bunch of retired generals and admirals that had me tacked on. I think we had enough experience in the group to know when people were telling us the truth and when they weren’t.
So, in Gaza itself, we jumped in some IDF vehicles and we went all the way to Swedish Village, which is the village–you don’t know is the area of the Philadelphi Corridor that meets the Mediterranean. We stopped off to look at some of the tunnel-digging operations that were going on.
And, the first thing that really struck me was the freedom of movement that the IDF have in that area: that they completely dominate it, to the point where they can take in a load of retired army officers from another country and be entirely confident that nothing bad is going to happen.
So, like, that was the first thing that struck me.
Second thing that struck me was the level of destruction. It is shocking to see it first hand. We’ve all seen photos, but when you’re actually there and you see the level of destruction, viscerally, that is quite a shocking thing to see. I understand why. I’m not going to claim that it’s because the IDF is malicious or deliberately destroying buildings because they think it’s funny. There is very clear evidence that every other house has a tunnel or a booby trap and the IDF have to do something about those and they can’t just send in the combat engineers every time they find one, or they’d never get anywhere.
So, I understand the destruction. But it is shocking.
And, it also points, I think, towards a real requirement for reconstruction after this war. If you don’t want this to be a festering sore[?] on Israel’s southwestern corner, it’s going to need a lot of investment from somebody, and I don’t think there’s a clear answer as to who that is going to be yet or what it’s going to look like.
Russ Roberts: Okay, we’ll come back to that, and also to that destruction. But when you say you’re a rapporteur, that’s a technical term. Explain what this group of retired officers and yourself were doing, relative to this Friend-of-the-Court brief. You were there to gather information for whose behalf?
Andrew Fox: So, it was kind of on the group’s behalf. The amicus curiae that we wrote is against the arrest warrants. We firmly had enough evidence that there is no deliberate starvation and never has been, that there’s no deliberate killing of civilians on a systematic scale and there never has been. And, we established that the IDF has legal procedures that should be followed and are peer mechanisms to those of our own armies. Therefore, complementarity has not been applied properly by the ICC [International Criminal Court] in applying for these warrants, because Israel should be given the chance to investigate their own war crimes before an international court jumps in.
Russ Roberts: Okay, so let’s go back to Rafah for a minute and the pictures that many of us have seen and others have seen on the ground, like yourself. Micah Goodman, Israeli author and thinker, likes to say that Israel has two goals that are contradictory: We want to be loved by the world, and we want to be feared. And, the destruction in Rafah is part of that fear thing. Worse, partly, it’s a military issue, which I want you to elaborate on about the booby traps and the tunnels. But I think some of the devastation that’s been wreaked on Gaza is to tell our unfriendly neighbors, ‘Don’t mess with us.’ The rest of the world looks at that and says, ‘We don’t love you anymore.’
Now, we’re learning here in Israel–and Jews around the world, I think, are learning–that a lot of people didn’t love us before, either. So, there’s a certain attitude of: Well, we’d have to do what we have to do. But, as you point out, in the photographs–and you’ve seen it on the ground–it’s like a moonscape. It’s desolation. It’s not just, ‘Oh, there’s been a war here.’ Is that a correct summary? And, what portion of Rafah would you say looks like that, if you can say?
Andrew Fox: Yeah, I can. I don’t agree with all of that entirely. I mean, yes, there is a requirement for a muscularity here. There is requirements in the Arab world to show strength rather than weakness; and that’s one of the reasons why the Iranian threat is now lingering over Israel because they’ve been made to look exceptionally weak and they’re keen to change that perception.
I think the quotes that you sort of put forward there implies a level of almost malevolence or spite that I don’t think exists, certainly not in the planning I’ve seen. Because, what there is, from what I can make out, is a very clear line, from the soldier putting their boots on the ground in Gaza, and the strategic objectives of the Israeli government. I think you can trace it all the way through–that the operational, strategic military side of things all the way to the political strategy, and it does make a degree of sense. I have some concerns over elements that we can go on to. I think perhaps a couple of the goals are slightly contradictory or mutually exclusive.
But, if you’re looking at what Israel is trying to do, in the context of 7th of October–which I think looms over this entire thing–they’ve tried to dismantle Hamas, including their fighting power and their infrastructure. Which is a long job and it’s not finished by any stretch of the imagination. They’re trying to return the hostages; and they’re trying to secure Israel’s borders.
I think deleting Hamas as a functioning organization is a big task, but the only way to do that is by destroying their infrastructure. That’s their power base. The tunnels are their power base. The buildings they have co-opted from civilians are their power base. The universities were their power base. And unfortunately, that power base is integral to the civilian municipal infrastructure, and you can’t separate them. So, it’s going to see destruction.
But, it’s not worse destruction than Raqa, or Homs, or Brosni, or Caen in 1944 in Northern France, or Warsaw in 1944. The difference being, of course, that Israel have killed far fewer civilians than people in those conflicts when they leveled those cities. So, there is a very critical difference between those cities I’ve listed and Gaza. But the destruction is similar.
Russ Roberts: So, you mentioned the civilian casualties. Some would argue–I think it’s a legitimate argument–that there’s no acceptable number of civilian casualties. Okay, so it’s not 40,000, because that includes Hamas fighters. Israel and you corroborated a number: maybe there’s 17,000 of the 40,000 that are–assuming the 40 is accurate, which I have no idea, nobody really has any idea, but let’s say it is–so 17 of the 40 are Hamas fighters. That leaves 23. Of those 23, some number of thousands would have died of natural causes. So, the real number–and then people argue about other things; almost doesn’t matter–thousands of people have died as a result of Israel’s attempts to dismantle Hamas. I’ve argued, in my writing, I don’t think we had a choice. There’s not an attractive choice to dismantling Hamas. You could argue we should do it even more humanely.
But, as far as I understand it–I’d like to get your thoughts–we have done that–Israel has done that–by trying to ask civilians to leave areas where Israel knows we’re going to be operating militarily. They’ve then been relocated, at first, to other cities, and then finally, to actual refugee camps–which is often a word misused, I think, in the conflict–but people living in tents. It’s horrible. It’s heart-wrenching. It’s frightening for those people. I understand that. But, as I understand that Israel has done much to minimize civilian casualties, and while the world, much of the world, accuses Israel of genocide. And yet, many civilians have been moved away from the conflict. Many have, of course, had hardship in moving away. Some of them probably couldn’t get away and died through all kinds of horribly unpleasant circumstances.
And finally, as you’ve pointed out, and I think is obvious: there’s no clear distinction between a civilian and a Hamas fighter. So, when we say, ‘Get out,’ I assume people with rifles get out, too and hide them in the back of their cart and live to fight another day. It’s not like the army is bedded down in trenches waiting for the Israeli army now to come into Khan Yunis after the civilians have been told to leave.
So, it’s a very messy situation. Talk about that issue of Israel’s ability to avoid civilian casualties–deaths–how well you think they’ve done it or poorly, and how’s it going.
Andrew Fox: Israel has taken a hit on operational success to try and guarantee civilian safety. If you look at the criticism that’s leveled at the moment, it’s been evolving throughout the conflict. We started off with ‘These airstrikes are a genocide,’ which moved on to ‘This ground assault is the genocide,’ which sort of moved on to ‘You are committing war crimes,’ when, I think, the genocide narrative started failing to stick. I don’t think anyone credible really thinks it’s the genocide anymore. I think that’s just for the extremists to keep screaming about.
But, as that has evolved, it’s now down to Israel is failing and they can’t succeed militarily. And, one of the things that’s holding them back is the humanitarian measures they’ve put in, which are the same humanitarian measures that people demanded they adhere to.
So, you can’t have it both ways. Either they’re going to have to protect the civilians and take the hit of the fact that Hamas fighters are going to move with the civilians, they’re going to hide in the humanitarian zones; or you can accept that this is going to be a slow mission if you insist on that.
So, this war has been absolutely prolonged by the humanitarian measures taken. As a result, far fewer civilians have been killed than they otherwise would have been. I think that’s a good thing. But, we do have to accept that this is a long mission that’s going to take a significant amount of time to finish now, because of the nature of that humanitarian effort.
I think there are areas of the IDF’s levels of protection that aren’t appreciated more widely. So, the Civilian Harm Mitigation Cell is like nothing I’ve ever seen. It’s a combination of kind of AI and open source intelligence and Arabic speakers and analysts. And they’ve essentially split Gaza down into a number of cells–that I think it’s over a hundred; I need to check the figure for you. And it tells you, by cell, how many people are usually there in the normal pattern of life, and then how many people are there at the moment. Then it’s updated hourly. Every single headquarters in the IDF has access to it when they’re planning strikes and operations. And, it’s actually an incredible method of civilian protection that no other army has. And, that gives you really an indication of just how much care Israel is taking.
And, as you say, of course, civilians will die in war. It’s why war is a very terrible thing and should be avoided at all costs. That’s why we have–we can go all the way back to Saint Augustine and talk about just war and jus ad bellum and jus in bello–just reasons for going to war, just conduct during the war.
And yes, there will be war crimes, there will be mistakes, there will be people who died unnecessarily; but that is unfortunately what war is like. And we seem to be very inoculated against that in the West. And, I don’t know if it’s by Hollywood or if it’s by computer games or if it’s by the fact that we haven’t fought a war other than a war of selective choice for the last 20 to 30 years. It could be any one of these factors in public perception. But people seem to have a complete lack of awareness of what war actually is and what it looks like–in the West, certainly.
So, humanitarian measures have been massive. The civilian casualty rates, I mean, I would estimate it’s 10- to 15,000 civilians. As you say, it’s still a huge number, but it’s vastly lower than Hamas claim, and as the international community sense [inaudible 00:16:40].
Russ Roberts: A lot of people have suggested that this war is essentially unwinnable. This takes the form of: Hamas is just an idea and you can’t kill an idea. It often takes the form of: Israel goes into Gaza City, evacuates it; those who are left are killed as best as Israel can achieve given the tunnel system or the presence of hostages and that they don’t want to kill. And, Israel then moves on to Khan Yunis, and Hamas comes back to Gaza City. Or: we knock out Haniyeh, and he is killed, but he’s just going to be replaced. He’s actually been replaced by Sinwar–which is fascinating. But, there’s always going to be a Hamas. There’s always going to be people who want to use or are willing to use violence against the Jewish state, and all we’re doing is killing civilians and our own soldiers to no appreciable outcome that could make a difference.
So, first question on that is: Can Israel win this war? And, obviously, you have to then ask: What would winning look like? What are your thoughts?
Andrew Fox: I don’t like ‘win-or-lose.’ I don’t think it’s useful. I think the way we measure success here is in terms of what strategic outcomes were articulated at the start of the war and what strategic objectives are achieved at the end of it.
For example, if–we can have two options here. Israel could go through the Gaza Strip, eradicate every bit of tunnel, kill every Hamas fighter they find, and at the end of it, try and do some sort of counterinsurgency where they replace Hamas’s governance with somebody else as yet unidentified. Would that be victory? Would that be success? Discuss.
Or, would actually some infrastructure left in place, some Hamas fighters left in place, but Hamas’s leadership take a deal similar to the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] in the first Lebanon War, and they agree to leave the country completely and never to return. I mean, would that be success?
So, win-and-lose isn’t useful here. What you’re looking at is positive strategic outcomes. And what Israel have said, from the start, is they want to dismantle Hamas. They want to secure Israel’s border, and they want to return the hostages.
And that’s the real paradox at the center of this conflict, is that it’s going to be very difficult to remove Hamas entirely and come to a deal to return the hostages at the same time. So, there’s going to have to be some compromise here, or you write off the hostages completely–which is obviously politically unacceptable. That would be a very utilitarian measure that I don’t think any prime minister would survive. So, there is going to be compromise at the end of this.
What Israel needs to do to achieve what we consider a successful outcome is to force Hamas to agree to terms that Israel sets, not that Hamas sets; and I think that is a successful outcome for Israel and the IDF in this conflict.
Russ Roberts: Yeah, for me, as you point out here and also in your writing, it’s obvious that there’s a tension between the goal of bringing the hostages home and dismantling Hamas. Although it’s a small number, but Israel did bring back four in an extraordinary military operation–was criticized relentlessly for doing that and killing civilians at the same time who were shooting at Israelis trying to liberate people who had been kidnapped. So, those two are in tension.
And as you point out, in democracy, you can’t ignore the hostages. And, morally you can’t because you failed them on October 7th, if you are the current government–which is mostly the same people: the same Prime Minister, the same head of the Army. Herzi Halevi, the head of the Army, has apologized for that failure. The Prime Minister, not so much. But, you’d argue that you have a moral imperative to try to bring them home. But at the same time, you don’t want future–the utilitarian calculation you alluded to–is you don’t want future abductions and deaths from Hamas to torment your population.
For me, I think the main–it would be extraordinary to bring the hostages home.
On the other two pieces–securing the border and dismantling Hamas–the dismantling Hamas means that there’s no threat for me. It means there’s no threat of military action from that particular part of the world, from Gaza. Hamas can move to the West Bank. It has support in the West Bank, it has people in the West Bank; that’s true. But I think, to tell the world that those who would attack Israel will pay a price and will be removed from their opportunity to do it again, is pretty amazing–would be a very successful outcome.
Russ Roberts: I would just say one more thing, and I’m curious if you have any thoughts on it. A lot of people accuse Israel of this desire for revenge. For me–I’m a newcomer, I wasn’t born here–but the Israelis I speak to who are born here, revenge is not their goal. Their children are currently in Gaza. In harm’s way. They don’t want them there. They want them home. They also want to defend their country. And, they’re proud to serve, and for their children to serve, because they think it’s a matter of justice and deterrence to secure a more secure state and people in the future.
I think that’s attainable. They may not succeed. Israel may not succeed at that. But, that’s a goal that is attainable, I think. And, I think, in the last week, Israel has made some progress on that. But, very much up in the air. Very much up in the air.
Andrew Fox: Yeah. Sorry, I was going to say, on the issue of revenge, it’s not something I’ve got a sense of. Actually, I really didn’t. I didn’t get a sense that there was bloodthirstyness.
And actually, if you look at the operational plans–and we went to Southern Command and got briefed by the commander there–there was a drumbeat throughout the week of IDF officers saying, explicitly, ‘We failed.’ And I heard that phrase, it must be 50 times. It was at every level, from the carrier[?] right down to brigade level. That failure was painfully felt. But, I got no sense of a murderous rage whatsoever. It was almost the opposite. It was almost an iciness to what they were doing. It’s methodological. It’s very, very precise and planned what they’re doing. There’s no going in there and no sense of just leveling blocks of the city for revenge’s sake. It couldn’t be further away from that.
What I do think is that, perhaps individual soldiers may have been motivated from a bit of hatred or revenge desire, and I think there are credible reports of civilians being shot perhaps outside of the rules of engagement. But they’re not massive, in terms of number. And I know the IDF MAG [Military Advocate General] are looking at a number of cases that involve potential transgressions.
And on top of that, I think the IDF has rotated somewhere in the region of 300,000 soldiers through Gaza since October the 7th. And, if you train young men and women to be aggressive, and if you arm them–if you send them into the terror of combat–some of them will cross the line. It’s inevitable, and it happens in every single army, from the bottom level to the top. I mean, at the moment, in the United Kingdom, we’re investigating our own Special Air Service Regiment, Special Forces for war crimes in Afghanistan that again seem credible. The Australians have already completed an investigation and found that they did commit war crimes in Afghanistan made their SAS [Special Air Service]. So, this happens in war, and that’s why we have war crimes legislation, to make sure that there can be people who commit crimes of that nature can be held accountable.
What’s different is that Israel seems to be held to a different standard internationally for the behavior of its soldiers, where even one transgression will bring international outrage down upon their heads. And, that’s not an atmosphere that other armies have to operate in.
Russ Roberts: You’ve written about it, but right now, Israeli soldiers are accused of abuse of some prisoners in Sde Teiman, a prisoner detention facility. If the stories are accurate, they’re horrific. Again, every decent Israeli I know is horrified by them. I’m sure there are some who are not horrified. We know there were riots to try to prevent the arrest of those people, which is, I think, deeply shameful. But, the Supreme Court has ruled, and I think will continue to rule, that they have to face the legal consequences of their actions, which again, as I think, what, as you suggest, distinguishes a moral society from an immoral society. And, we’ll see how that goes.
I do worry that some of those investigations here don’t always have the follow-through that you’d expect in some countries. There are a lot of people here who are angry about that and talk about it a lot. I don’t know how correct they are. I expect to have some of them on down road on the program. But, it is really important that savagery is punished, not rewarded, and it does make a difference.
Andrew Fox: Yeah. I spoke earlier about conducting warfare being just, and that’s really important for the moral legitimacy of what Israel is trying to do in Gaza. What gives Israel the moral authority to conduct this war is the fact that Hamas are monsters and committed, the 7th of October, atrocities. If–and it’s if: nothing’s proven yet; it looks dodgy, I suspect it might well be proven–but if this stuff happens on a much bigger scale, then you lose that moral legitimacy to go to war and that’s incredibly damaging.
But, what reassures me is the fact that something has been done about it. I’ve got a friend in the military Advocate General’s department who is righteously outraged about this and is very keen to make sure that these soldiers are held accountable.
And, as you say, if things are allowed to slip through the cracks, if things are brushed under the carpet, then that deserves condemnation. And it deserves criticism. And, as you say, we shouldn’t hold back at criticizing, legitimately, just because other people are criticizing illegitimately. And, I think it’s very important that, if this is truly the morals we aspire to and the leadership we aspire to and the values that set us apart from savages, that we have to insist that those are upheld by our justice systems.
Russ Roberts: Do you think there’s any–one of the propaganda claims against Israel–and of course it could be true: some propaganda is true–but one of the cudgels, the clubs that have been used against Israel, is that there’s a famine in Gaza. There was a period of time, I’m sure you could follow it with some kind of Google analysis, where there was a relentless drumbeat that Gaza was being deliberately starved. Of course, there’s a question of whose fault that is. Hamas steals, just like they stole the money that they used to build the tunnels instead of providing a decent society for their fellow citizens. They didn’t build any air raid shelters. They used it for military purposes. But, there was a claim that Israel was starving Gaza and that Gaza was on, if not currently suffering famine, on the verge of a famine.
Did you see anything–I think you dismissed it in passing a few minutes ago. Why do you think that’s not the case if that is indeed what you said? And, do you think there have been issues of aid getting to the non-Hamas part of Gaza?
Andrew Fox: Distribution of aid in a war zone is always a challenge–always a challenge–because it’s a war zone. And we’ve seen the damage and destruction to infrastructure that happens in warfare, and that makes it really difficult to get food out. There’s a lot to unpack here. We’ll start with the start of the war and the allegations of a siege.
Patently nonsense. Israel didn’t have the capability to impose a siege on Gaza at the start of the war, because Israel controlled–sorry–Egypt controlled the Rafah crossing. If there was a siege, then that means Egypt is complicit in this because they could have quite easily opened that up during the early stages of the war.
Now we look at October the 7th. Yes, two out of three water supplies into Gaza from Israel were damaged. Who were they damaged by? Hamas fire.
The electricity lines were cut or damaged by rocket fire on October the 7th. Who fired those rockets? Again, that was Hamas.
How quickly did Israel have the chance to start repairing this stuff? Well, actually the areas where it was damaged was the very area where the IDF was trying to fight Hamas. Well, I should say also, the Israeli police were fighting Hamas because I think they’re the unsung heroes of 7th of October.
You can’t start putting in infrastructure repairs in the area you are fighting the enemy who’ve just invaded you, overrun your defenses, and massacred a number of your civilians. And, it’s quite correct that the IDF put a priority on making sure Israel internally was secure before they started fixing any of this stuff.
Move on a couple of weeks, and yes, there was a period where the Israeli parts of the Gaza border were controlled. But, there should have been supplies in Gaza to keep people going for that one-week, two-week period.
And, it’s also a legitimate tactic, in the sense of: an assault was coming and Israel had to set conditions for that. And, you can’t just say: In warfare you can’t do anything to the enemy because civilians might be harmed. It doesn’t work like that.
But there’s no evidence of any seizure. And they were already surging aid into Gaza in October[?].
Where we’re at now, the infrastructure Israel has put in place to try and deliver that aid is remarkable. They’ve built roads in Rafah which they can open and close for when combat operations are taking place, so the aid still flows even when ground forces are maneuvering.
And, remember, before 7th of October, the only route in the south for aid was the Philadelphi Corridor because Hamas wanted to control it; and Israel have expanded that straight away.
They’ve even built a road–they’re even using a road–inside Israel itself, where aid comes from inside Gaza, goes back into Israel, past Be’eri, past Nir Oz, past these places that were so badly damaged on 7th of October–they’re within stone’s throw of these kibbutzim–to get to Gate 96 and then deliver the road into Central Gaza. So, even something that is so emotive and sensitive has been disregarded to make sure that aid keeps flowing.
And, then, of course, the Erez Crossing in the North was damaged by Hamas on 7th of October; and Israel have built not one but two vehicle crossings now into Northern Gaza.
So, the statistics [?] are pushing out, there is more calories going into Gaza now than there were before the war, on a daily basis. And, their estimates are, it’s about 3,600 calories per person going into Gaza, when the average human just needs 2,100 to keep alive for a day. So, any starvation or any famine is blatantly the results of distribution issues within Gaza itself.
Firstly, that’s a war zone. Secondly, UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] and the UN [United Nations] are unfit for purpose.
And, the vast majority of aid is being distributed by private humanitarian agencies who work with the IDF. There have been 16,000 coordinations of aid convoys inside Gaza itself for when IDF maneuver-operations are taking place so that humanitarian workers can stay out of harm’s way. In terms of shooting incidents, we’re looking at around 10 out of those 16,000 where a shooting incident has mistakenly occurred. I think it’s pure libel at this point to suggest that Israel is deliberately causing a famine.
Russ Roberts: I’m very active on X–on Twitter. Too active. I spend a lot of time there looking for good news and fearing bad news. I actually learn things now and then, so I’m still a fan of it. But, I’m very aware that I mainly see pro-Israel stuff. I follow some people who are not explicitly pro-Israel or are very critical of Israel; but in general, Mr. Musk makes sure that I see things that make me happy. And then, every once in a while, he throws me some really ugly videos and narratives that are critical of Israel.
And, if you watch those–which I force myself to do from time to time–you realize that those on the other side of the fence from me–meaning just the pro-Palestinian folks–they’re getting a steady stream of Israeli atrocities in their Twitter feed. They’re getting stories that Israeli snipers shoot children, multiple times, presumably for fun, target practice. That they target civilians.
Now, I’m president of a college. Sixty percent of our students are in the Reserves. Almost every one of them has served in the IDF. I’ve talked to them about what it’s like to be a soldier in that army. They believe–perhaps correctly, perhaps not–that they are held to a moral standard by their commanders. But, maybe I’m looking at an inaccurate sample. I find those atrocity stories hard to believe, but I’m sure they find–the other side finds–our stories of how eager Israel evacuates civilians and lets in humanitarian aid–they see that also as propaganda.
Did you see anything that gave you moral pause about how Israel is conducting this war? Do you believe those stories of snipers and buildings that are destroyed with women and children inside? In the taking out of Mohammed Deif, who is a remarkably bad man, I think it was–is it 90? Casualties come out within seconds–slightly non-credible–but I think 90 citizens, civilians were killed in that according to Hamas, mostly or half or something women and children. I have no idea if it’s true. I don’t want to believe it’s true. I live here, I’m proud to live here, I’m proud of my students who are soldiers. But maybe I’m drinking the Kool-Aid here.
Andrew Fox: Social media is a minefield when it comes to this stuff. And I generally–if you look at my feed, I generally won’t repost either the IDF’s claims or Hamas claims. And I will actually hide and block people that just drop what I call ‘atrocity pornography’ onto my timeline. It adds nothing to the debate. A picture of a dead child is useless in this context. It’s designed to emotionally stimulate you. Of course, if we look at the physiology of that stimulation, it actively suppresses the prefrontal cortex, which is your critical thinking space. It activates your amygdala and it leads you to false conclusions because you’re thinking with emotion rather than rationality.
You also have no means of verifying that picture or verifying that video. You have no idea of the context, what happened before or afterwards.
And it’s all part of an information war that’s being fought online. So I generally just disregard both sides when it comes to that.
But, I have the luxury, of course, of being a professional researcher with other ways of finding this stuff out. And that is not a luxury that is available to 99 out of every hundred people.
Do I believe that there will have been instances where somebody has been shot illegally by the IDF? Yes. Yes, I do. Without a question. As I said, it happens in every army. I don’t think it’s an IDF thing. It’s not something that only Israel does.
Do I believe there’ll be accountability for those crimes when they happen? I don’t know. It takes a lot for a unit to effectively grass-up their mates–to snitch on their mates–when they’ve been in a war zone together. So, you know, these things are a tragedy of warfare and are to be condemned, quite clearly.
But, is there a systematic policy of shooting civilians? I don’t think so. What I think is problematic is the rules of engagement where they do impose kill zones effectively, where if somebody is in that zone, they are fair game as a target.
That goes slightly beyond what we would have done in Afghanistan. We had something called 429 Alpha, which was the most loose rule of engagement we would be given. And that was quite sparing: it wasn’t used very often. And, that was that anyone who was perceived as a potential threat could be shot. Which is very different to anyone moving around in this zone can be shot.
So, that concerns me slightly. But I suppose, if you take that in tandem with the fact they’ve evacuated the civilians in very many areas of the Gaza operation, they’ve been operating in effectively ghost towns and nobody there. I think there were 250,000 people, tops, left in Gaza City when they went through there. So, you can make an argument that everyone left behind is Hamas, therefore they can be engaged.
That doesn’t sit wildly comfortably with me.
But, when we go to the bigger weaponry, you look at air strikes. I’ve sat in an IDF targeting cell in the last two weeks, and I’ve seen how they go through their targeting process. And it is rigorous. When it comes to strikes like Deif, there may well have been civilians nearby. There will also have been a lot of Hamas nearby. You’re not going to have a senior commander of that level who isn’t surrounded by the various staff that go with, effectively, a general. And we have very good evidence that Hamas is a really well-organized army along those chain-of-command lines.
Israel did go in massive force against Deif. I think it was two or three 2,000-pounders and a bunker buster. But, that is not excessive to kill the second-in-command of the enemy’s army. That is proportional under the law of armed conflict, to use that force when you can identify someone that critical to the war effort.
So, yeah, it looked awful. Civilians almost certainly were killed. I would argue that much more, many more Hamas were killed, just from military logic. And, it was proportional.
So, everything has context. Everything has military rationale behind what the IDF are doing, and it’s that that needs to be examined, not the end state. You cannot judge the success of a military strike by looking at that kind of human impact. You have to be very cold and you have to be very dispassionate when it comes to analyzing this stuff and measuring it against the legal standard by which armies should be held to.
Russ Roberts: I just want to add that, as an economist, Israel, as I suggested a minute ago, has had a fairly successful week or few weeks where Deif was eliminated, was killed. Shukr was killed–the person who had overseen the rocket launching that killed the 12 children in the Druze village recently. Israel recently took out and killed Ismail Haniyeh, the political head of Hamas who’d been living in luxury in Qatar. And people said, ‘Oh, why now? Why’d they wait this long?’ The answer is because they had an agreement. Israel has an agreement with Qatar not to kill anybody they’re hosting–very Middle Eastern issue by the way. One of the reasons Iran is so upset is that he was their guest, and somehow–it’s still not entirely clear–he was killed in his bedroom.
But, I always want to make the observation that, people say, ‘Well, he’ll just get replaced. What difference does it make?’ And, the answer is that the people who do the replacing are not as skilled as the person who was there before, almost certainly. The bench is not as good as the starters. And, they’re not as skilled, they’re not as smart, they’re not as charismatic, they’re not as organizationally sophisticated, and it degrades the operational quality of the enemy. So, that’s just something to mention.
Russ Roberts: I want to go back to something you said a minute ago about sitting in on an airstrike. In the early days of the war, there was horrifically damaging report that came out of a joint Israeli-Palestinian website. And, the report argued that Israel was targeting airstrikes using artificial intelligence [AI], and that a human being only looked at that for 20 seconds before making a decision–presumably to pull the trigger or not. The IDF did a cursory response to that–we’ll talk in a minute about the IDF’s communications issues–but the IDF responded to that and said, ‘No, no, no, that’s a database. It’s not used for operational decisions.’ A minute ago, you said that sitting in on there, on a strike, it was very rigorous. Are you able to talk about what you saw, how that decision was made even in broad strokes, and what kind of issues get considered, at least when you were there?
Andrew Fox: Yeah, I’m familiar with the article you’re talking about, and that particular magazine, I consider to be a deeply unreliable and biased source. I’ve looked at a lot of their outputs and it doesn’t impress me, frankly. I think they’re a poor source with a deliberate agenda.
And yeah, the IDF response makes sense from what I’ve seen. So, yes, they get intelligence on targets, and yes, they use datasets and they use AI to collate that. But then, there’s a whole load of steps to jump through, in terms of looking at the area, looking at the building, looking at the munition to be selected, looking at the collateral damage that would be caused by a strike at what moment in time. They look at civilian presence. And, they’ve canceled one in every two airstrikes since the start of the war because it’s failed at any one of those stages.
And it’s absolutely recognizable to me, from my own experience of targeting and calling for airstrikes. It’s not any different to what the British or the Americans would do in the same situation.
There’s been criticism over the sorts of munitions used. The 2,000-pounder dumb bombs has been used as a point of criticism on numerous occasions. And people miss the point, of course, that a dumb bomb is still accurate to within 30 meters when it’s fired by a smart aircraft and a smart pilot. So, there’s not just one brain in this chain.
The Israelis have shown that they will use a much, much smaller munition where they can: something like a GBU-39 is, like, 250 pounds. It’s tiny. On top of that, they’ve got kinetic weapons that just use sheer force to punch through a target. And actually, you can see them. They were used on the WCK [World Central Kitchen] Kitchen strike–the one where the aid workers were killed. But, if you look at the vehicles, you can see it was a non-explosive warhead that was used to strike them. And, actually, that was the first time we’ve had confirmation that Israel used those–obviously confirmed in tragic circumstances.
But, in terms of the targeting process, it’s completely recognizable versus their peers in other foreign armies, and it gave me no sign of concern at all.
Russ Roberts: Let’s talk about the communication issue. It’s very common among defenders of Israel, particularly American Jews, to say with a shake of the head, ‘Yeah, Israel does conduct war very morally, but they’ve got a terrible problem with making the case. The communications are awful.’ And I used to find that somewhat compelling. Israel has a reputation, which is somewhat true, for being blunt, for not caring what people think about you. And, in some ways, there’s a certain swagger here that: We do what we have to do and we don’t care what the world thinks. It’s not really the wisest strategy, so in some sense, that criticism is important.
At the same time, I’ve come to believe that, while we could certainly do a better job with communications, it doesn’t really matter. The world is going to make their–many people in the world are going to make their judgment accordingly. I mean, unaccordingly, I guess, would be the right phrase: they’re going to be critical regardless of how superb the communication effort is.
But, I do think Israel should do a better job. It wouldn’t hurt; and it would help sometimes. And I’m curious, the phrase in Hebrew is hasbara, which means explanation or communication. PR [public relations] is another way you could translate it. Israel’s PR could use some help. What are your observations on that?
Andrew Fox: Yeah, I’m smiling wryly because the first time I started commenting on this, I got accused of being a hasbara agent. I had no idea what hasbara was, and I had to go and Google it. So, you know, I’m very familiar with that.
The issue you’ve identified, I think, is that Israel has vacated the battlefield on the information war for this conflict. And, this conflict is different. And, it might have worked in previous conflicts to have just gone on with it and ignored world opinion, but it’s a very specific strategic aim of Hamas in this conflict to damage Israel on the international scale–on the international stage–to degrade Israel’s viability and legitimacy as a country in the eyes of large parts of the world.
And it has been incredibly successful in doing that. You’ve seen that with countries like Ireland, Spain, Norway, legitimizing the states of Palestine. Now, okay: All three of those countries have massive anti-Semitism problems historically, so it’s hardly surprising that it would be those three that did it. And, I think it was illegal to be Jewish in Norway until relatively recently. So, their track record is pretty poor.
But certainly, the weaponization of lawfare, Israel’s vacation of the information space has encouraged those lawfare efforts. Like, the ICJ [International Court of Justice (United Nations)] case with South Africa is patently a farce, but a lot of what they’ve used to try and prove genocidal intent is the stupid stuff some politicians have been saying back in October. And, I’m not talking necessarily about Netanyahu or Gallant here because I think they’ve been misrepresented, but Ben Gvir and Smotrich and their fellow travelers, it’s almost as if they’re trying to lose these cases single-handedly. And we’ve seen another example from Smotrich of that in the last 48 hours.
This stuff is important in 2024 in a way it never was in previous years, because the information flow globally is unprecedented. We’re living in an era of human history where people have more access to data and information than they’ve ever had before, thanks to social media and the Internet. And, people are going to form opinions based on that information they receive.
Now, it’s a failure at, perhaps, state policy level that we didn’t see this coming and we haven’t trained our students and our children, almost from primary school level, to deal with that information flow and learn how to critically analyze, learn how to do source analysis, learn how to formulate their own opinions.
But, Hamas have exploited this information deluge. And they’ve exploited it in a way that is designed to generate emotion. And it goes back to what I was saying earlier. There’s some really interesting polling that suggests that the people in the West who’ve most turned against Israel are young women who are motivated by the disinformation and the appeals to emotion that we see from Hamas’s information campaign. And, you can make a fairly logical deduction. That’s because young women tend to be very high on empathy. And, when they see these images of dead children, of course, that is going to turn them against Israel.
There’s also a medium of transmission that I think Israel have missed completely. I understand what Admiral Hagari is trying to do. But, it really isn’t the most compelling way of persuading the West to have a slightly older gentleman in uniform with a very thick Hebrew accent–it just doesn’t connect with people. And, I understand his function as the spokesman. But Israel is–where are the–and I mean this in a non-flippant way–where are the memes? Where are the TikTok videos? Where are the things that young people are using to get their news? 70% of young people get their news from social media; and Israel has completely vacated that space.
So, I think, to summarize–and while it’s gone by, this kind of just-ignore-it and get-on-with-it strategy was fine–in 2024, where your enemy is deliberately fighting an information war against you, this is a battlefield you need to be fighting on, rather than just walking away.
Russ Roberts: Yeah. I’m just going to make an observation for our long-time listeners about Arnold Kling’s Three Languages of Politics. Liberals–in Kling’s taxonomy–see the world through the lens of oppressor versus oppressed; conservatives see the world through the lens of civilization versus barbarism; and libertarians see the world through coercion versus voluntary action. And, this moment, I think for Jews around the world, is deeply disturbing because, as you point out, a lot of young people seem to be very, very anti-Israel, very much sympathetic with Hamas. We see this with Hamas. I said that as if that’s just a normal phrase. This organization that’s committed to the destruction of the State of Israel has said they will repeat October 7th over and over again. That murdered, raped, and kidnapped innocent people going about their lives, in villages and towns and kibbutzes that were literally there to improve relationships between Palestinians in Gaza and Israel. It’s an incredible tragedy.
But, to compound that, and this feeling of injustice that I think a lot of Jews feel is that: You’re going to reward their barbarism by supporting their cause? I mean, forget whether the cause is good or not. Again, depends what you mean by the cause. If you mean autonomy for Palestinians, a lot of Israelis want that, if we can find a way to do it consistent with our security. But, you’re going to talk about ‘From the river to the sea,’–the elimination of the Jewish state?
So, it’s a moment where it’s really hard to understand what’s going on, and I think a lot of Jews emotionally have, mostly correctly, seen that while that thing called anti-Semitism–I call Jew-hatred–that we thought was something our grandparents or great-grandparents had to deal with is not over. Okay, fine.
For me, I find some comfort in the fact that I think some–a lot, perhaps–of the antagonism toward the state of Israel and towards the Jewish people right now is not related to their Jewishness. It’s related to this mindset of oppressor versus oppressed. And, by slotting Israel and the Palestinians into that lens, ignoring the nuance that there seems to be a civilization/barbarism thing happening at the same time. And I’ve written an essay about how the fact that each of these sides has their own blind spot. They can’t imagine that the other issue matters. I think they all matter. I think we should care about oppression versus oppressed. We should care about civilization versus barbarism.
But, I think a lot of the attacks on Israel and the lack of sympathy with Israel, it’s not anti-Semitism, it’s not Jew-hatred: it’s that it’s the most prominent, repeated, relentlessly written-about example of a powerless people being abused by a powerful people. Yeah, so October 7th happened. Some people just can’t even see that. But most people agree it happened. But, it’s dwarfed by what happened before that in their mind and what’s happening now. And it’s not a Jewish issue. It is a power-versus-powerless issue. And I think, that hasbara issue is totally ignored, and I think Israel needs to deal with that. And so does the West, by the way: it’s not just an Israeli problem.
Andrew Fox: And, you’re also in that paradox or that contradiction in terms where you have no choice, as Israel, to be powerful. You have to be. You’re surrounded by countries that are committed to your extermination. As you said, it’s in Hamas’s charter. It’s in Iran’s stated objective, is to remove the Zionist entity. This stuff is explicit. Which leaves Israel with no choice but to have a powerful military and a relatively aggressive foreign policy. That’s very, very hard to square with images of F-16s dropping bombs on people’s homes.
There’s an absolute kind of tension there that’s impossible to get around in terms of perception. And, I completely agree with your analysis that a lot of it is oppressor versus oppressed. Because, you go to these people and you ask them, when they’re singing ‘From the river to the sea,’ you ask them which river and which sea, and they don’t know. It’s almost totemic. It’s almost like there’s a conceptual Israel versus an Israel in reality. They have turned Israel conceptually into a sort of cipher for all their anger at the world’s injustices, and they’ve projected all their rage at the unfairness in the world onto Israel as some kind of totem that represents all of that injustice.
So, actually, in terms of the protests that they’re undertaking, they’re almost not protesting Israel: they’re protesting something different. It’s just that Israel is the vocabulary they have, to express what they want to feel. Because if you really cared about the West Bank, and if you really cared about Gaza, you would know which river and which sea you are trying to free, the land between. You would know that. That would be the first thing you’d learn. And, yet they don’t even know the very basic fact.
Russ Roberts: Yeah. That’s the second thing you’d learn, I think. A previous guest, Ahmed Alkhatib, certainly recognizes this, that Hamas is not good for Israel and it’s not good for Gaza. They’re a terrible, terrible thing for the people there who want to have decent lives for their children and to just have the opportunity to flourish.
I would just–just a footnote: I think Hamas amended their charter in 2017 to take out the destroy-Israel part, but they act as if they still want to destroy Israel, and they’re happy to say that they want to destroy Israel. So, in a way, it’s kind of moot. [More to come, 58:50]
Russ Roberts: Let’s turn to Lebanon, Israel’s–another enemy. People forget: We’re in a war with Hezbollah. It’s been a war since the very first days, in the aftermath of October 7th. Thousands of rockets have rained down on the northern border of Israel, killing 12 children recently, but forcing 60,000 people to leave their homes. 15,000 children are not in school now for what will be the second year in a row. They’ll be doing something makeshift, wherever hotels they’re staying in or wherever they are. This cannot stand. You cannot have a country that is under perpetual attack so that the Northern Territory is uninhabitable.
And yet, Hezbollah is not in an urban zone like Hamas. They’re in a wooded, mountainous, hilly region where Israel has operated multiple times in the past with no great success.
Hezbollah is a–I hate this phrase–proxy of Iran. I don’t see them as–I don’t think that word matters. Iran is–we’re in a war with Iran right now. This moment people say, ‘Don’t escalate.’ Well, the status quo is unacceptable. I don’t know what Israel is supposed to do–is to allow its citizens to continue to be attacked? So, I’m curious if you think there’s any–if you talk to anyone about this and if you’ve seen that area, and if you have any thoughts on how different that will be if Israel does try to move north, which it talks about all the time.
Andrew Fox: It’s a really tricky one because–I think ‘proxy’ is probably the right phrase at this point. It’s not when applied to Hamas. Hamas is not a proxy of Iran. They’re an ally, and only a sometime ally as well. They’re working to the same goal, but they’re not directed from Tehran in the way that Hezbollah are.
And actually, I think–but, we’re framing this incorrectly. As you say, Israel has tried repeatedly to invest into Southern Lebanon. On each occasion they’ve gone in, the defending forces have been better and better dug in, and better and better armed. And, if it didn’t succeed in 2006, I think it’s hard to make the case that there’s an obvious military solution in 2024.
For me, the issue is very much sat[?] with the Iranian regime in Tehran. And, for me, the answer is to hit and hit them now, and hit them hard. I don’t know if you’re aware of the Caroline Affair that established the Principle of Anticipatory Self-Defense. And essentially, the outcome of that was that anticipatory self-defense is justified in cases where there is a necessity of self-defense that is instant, overwhelming, leaving no other choice and no moment for deliberation. And, I think we’re there. I think we’re there right now. When you’ve got someone threatening to launch 600 rockets and drones at you, this feels like the moment, for me, to start taking out installations and military capability within Iran itself.
That still means you’ll have to deal with Hezbollah, but that’s something you can do as a slow bleed. I think you have to accept the displacements in Northern Israel. There’s no quick solution here. You have to accept that it’s going to go on for a while. And, just as with innocent guards and civilians in tents on the beach, those Israelis are going to have to be in hotels for a while or found alternative accommodation until they can move home.
But, there’s no quick solution here. I think–the solution I would propose would be to punch Iran in the mouth as hard as you can, continue to degrade Hezbollah through airstrikes in Southern Lebanon. And, again, hope that will, again, that will force them–as hopefully, actions in Gaza will force Hamas–to the negotiating table, where they agree to back down or you will kill them. That’s the brutality and that’s why we have war as an extension of politics by the admixture of other means–as good old Clausewitz [Carl von Clausewitz] said. You have to flex your military muscle to achieve policy gains somehow. It’s not an easy solution and it’s not a quick solution, but I don’t see any easy or quick solution in this situation.
Russ Roberts: For people who weren’t paying close attention, you know, on October 7th, Hamas launched hundreds and hundreds of rockets into Israel. I was here on that day. Air raid sirens were blaring numerous times during the day. It was a Jewish holiday. And since then, Hamas has launched many, many rockets–not so many lately, which is a sign, I think, of the–‘not so many’ is being sarcastic–they’re basically done. Their ability to threaten Israel militarily is, at least right now, non-existent.
Hezbollah is very different. Hezbollah has a hundred-plus, thousand, missiles. They’re much larger than Hamas’s. They’re much more accurate than Hamas’s. And so, there’s this weird warm war–it’s not cold, but it’s not fully hot–where Hezbollah rains destruction on those communities, most of which have been evacuated. And now there’s soldiers there in defense. And, they’ve implicitly agreed not to rain missiles on Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.
If Iran were to be punched in the mouth–which by the way would be very hard, I think, for Netanyahu to do for a whole bunch of reasons, but one of them would be unacceptable right now for the American Administration that’s eager to have quiet before an election–it would jeopardize military supplies. It’s a whole ‘nother issue of what Israel has to do in the future. But, I don’t know if that’s–I’m not sure what you’ve laid out is going to be very successful. I’m worried about it.
Andrew Fox: Yeah, and that’s fair. I don’t see what the alternative solution is. You know, that’s the issue.
Russ Roberts: Fair enough.
Andrew Fox: It’s actually similar to Gaza. It’s a case that Israel has had to take the least worst option on the tail. The IDF didn’t want to have to go into Gaza. They didn’t want to have to dismantle Hamas. They didn’t want to commit hundreds of thousands of Israel’s young people to a war that’s going to go on for potentially at least another year. They didn’t want to have to take the economic impact that comes from having a reservist army who are going to have to be taken away from their day jobs; and they didn’t want the economic impact of supply chains being impacted. But they’ve had no choice but to go into Gaza and do something about Hamas.
And it’s the same here. You know, I’m pretty sure that Israel just wants to live in peace. That’s all anyone wants, truly.
And yet Iran is not giving them that option. So, something needs to be done about Iran. When and at what point is another question.
There is always the danger that a proxy of Iran will fire all of their rockets into Israel and you’ve got Tel Aviv on fire–which is clearly what nobody wants to see. But, something needs to be done.
I’m not sure that just the campaign and by airstrike of degrading Hezbollah is going to be completely successful or achieve the return of those Israelis back to their homes in the north of Israel. So, what else is there? And, I’ll throw that back to you because I don’t know.
Russ Roberts: Yeah. Well, I’m not the right person to ask. But I guess what’s remarkable about Israel: we are really bad at preparing for things, and we’re really good at coping with the aftermath of bad preparation. I mean, the logistical success of the killing of Haniyeh, the rescue of the four hostages in Gaza a month or two ago–and that’s just the beginning. I mean, Israel has assassinated nuclear scientists in Iran. The most brilliant thing that we did is we put a computer virus in their computer system that they did their nuclear calculations on and delayed their acquisition of a nuclear bomb. I looked to something of that nature. But that’s a longer story.
Russ Roberts: Let’s close with your time here [in Israel–Econlib Ed.]. You were here a week, is that right?
Russ Roberts: You, in passing, mentioned the kibbutzim, Be’eri and others. Did you visit those in your trip here? Were you able to see some of the aftermath of October 7th, and did you have any thoughts on that?
Andrew Fox: Yeah. So, in April, I went to Be’eri. Last week, we went to Nir Oz. And I’ve been to the Nova Festival site as well. And, as I wrote for the Jewish Chronicle in the United Kingdom when I came back, it’s very easy to study a war in concept. It’s very easy to say, ‘Goodness: 1,200 people have been killed and there have been mutilations, and rapes, and torture, and hostages taken.’ And, you can go, ‘Yeah, that’s really terrible.’ But, it doesn’t move you in the sense that you are moved when you see it in person. That was something of a conceptual game-changer for me. Because I’m used to analyzing war. I’m used to looking at conflicts and knowing that hundreds, essentially thousands of people have died in the place I’m looking at and reading about, and I’m used to seeing aerial photos of damaged cities and damaged towns.
What I’m not used to is treading in certs[?] that I know for a fact has human bones and human remains mixed into it, because the body was so damaged that they couldn’t retrieve every part of it. I’m not used to that at all. I’m not used to walking in people’s homes and seeing blood stains on the floor. And, even talking about it weeks later, I could feel the hair on the back of my arms prickling at the thought.
I think one of the reasons that sympathy for Israel dissipated so quickly after 7th of October is that the horrors were so atrocious that people simply can’t conceptualize them unless they’ve seen them themselves.
And, I understand why Israel hasn’t wanted to make capital out of that. There’s a respect for the dead. There is a distaste for making what happened there into a lurid revelation rather than just a tragedy to be absorbed.
But having seen those sites firsthand–you know, I did three tours in Afghanistan, and I’ve never seen anything close to that [inaudible 01:10:06], and this was weeks and months after it actually happened.
So, yeah, incredibly moving, incredibly shocking, and it did give me a perspective on this conflict that I think perhaps other people don’t have for that reason. They just haven’t trodden in those footsteps.
Russ Roberts: My guest today has been Andrew Fox. He writes at Andrew Fox’s Substack.
Andrew, thanks for being part of EconTalk.
Andrew Fox: Thanks very much.
