There are wide-ranging arguments about what makes a state legitimate, or what gives it authority in a way that creates a duty to obey. There is one type of argument that I have always found unsatisfactory, and while thinking about it recently I realized why it has always seemed to me to be lacking in my mind.
The argument I have in mind can be found in the work of thinkers such as Thomas Christiano, author of Rule of the Majority: A Fundamental Problem in Democratic Theory. Cristiano argues that democracy gives authority to governments because of the obligation to treat members of our society equally and show appropriate respect. In Cristiano’s view, when a law is passed democratically with majority support, disobeying that law is putting one’s own judgment above that of one’s fellow citizens. This means treating our fellow citizens as inferiors, and that is wrong. Therefore, there is an obligation to follow democratically passed laws.
There are many reasons to doubt this claim. Why should we believe that we have a moral obligation to defer to the judgments of others if their judgments are more popular than our own? Moreover, what makes this obligation an obligation? enforceable Obligations – Obligations that can be enforced through coercion? If you go back a few decades, a majority of Americans opposed interracial marriage. Nonetheless, some people married across racial lines anyway. Those who did so clearly believed (correctly!) that their judgment on the matter was better than that of the majority of their fellow citizens. It seems patently false to say that by doing this they have done something wrong by believing that they have better judgment than the majority, let alone being impermissibly wrong in a way that makes coercion acceptable.
But there is a more fundamental reason why I find this idea unconvincing. Arguments like these miss a concept that is much more emphasized in classical liberalism and the liberal tradition: the concept of reciprocity.
I think the increased liberal focus on reciprocity is why liberals are so likely to cite the work of Ronald Coase. It is not that Coase’s work is somehow uniquely helpful to liberal policy. You can’t start with the Coase theorem and go straight to anarcho-capitalism from there. However, Coase pointed out that economists have been conceptualizing externalities in the wrong way. Previous economic analyzes viewed externalities as one-sided imposition of costs. However, Coase pointed out that externalities are reciprocal. Imposition goes both ways between both parties. (This conclusion was also reached independently by the fictional physicist. Sheldon Cooper!) For this reason, attempts to correct externalities by saying “taxes should be imposed on the party that created the externality” are not successful.
Cristiano’s argument suffers from a similar lack of reciprocity. Even if we assume that putting one’s judgment above that of another person is an unacceptable mistake, the situation is still mutual. Because if my fellow citizens tell me that I must do as they decide, I am placing my judgment above theirs and mistreating them if I do not. I can say the same by forcing myself to do what they decide. Crucially, they are putting their own judgment above mine, viewing me as an inferior person, and treating me unfairly. The situation is reciprocal. And while dealing with the “error” of valuing one’s own judgment over that of others in this non-reciprocal way, Christiano’s theory simply treats people equally in a two-fold way: “some animals are more equal than others.” It’s just that.
I previously assert Yoram Hazony’s concern that a firm commitment to free trade could weaken the bonds of mutual loyalty on which countries depend is equally flawed. I gave a hypothetical example of being faced with a choice between buying cheap lumber from a Canadian named Carl or paying more for the same lumber from an American colleague named Walter.
Perhaps Hazony feels he has a duty rooted in loyalty to buy from Walter instead of Carl, but it’s not clear why. Ultimately, something Hazony often references is the following idea: mutual loyalty – The important thing about mutual loyalty is that mutual. Duty goes both ways. So why would you say I failed to show proper loyalty to Walter by purchasing from Carl? Wouldn’t you say that Walter would not be showing proper loyalty to me by asking me to buy, despite the enormous additional financial burden he would impose on me? Simply saying “mutual loyalty” does nothing to solve this problem.
One of the most recent works of liberal political philosophy (in my opinion, by no means humble). minimal care Dan Moller makes a similar point about dealing with the impermissibility of certain actions in a reciprocal way.
I would argue that, perhaps contrary to other expressions of classical liberal thought, the core impulse is not anger at being asked to do so. giveIt baffles me, in the first place, at the suggestion that we deserve it. demand. Impulses travel through the conjunction table. me I couldn’t make that request. If you think about it, that would be absurd. you Making such demands of them; So the following becomes clear: them You shouldn’t make such demands of us.
Moller writes, “If we recognize even the slightest restraint on making others worse off in order to improve our own lot” and if we apply these restraints in a reciprocal and equal way among citizens, “we can quickly become a form of liberalism.” “You will fall into it,” he claims.
Of course, this is not the only theory of political authority. But I find it surprising that so many theories of political authority, such as those based on mutual loyalty and appropriate respect for the judgment of others, ignore or should ignore the problem of reciprocity that such principles seem to entail.
