The war in Ukraine consisted of moral conflict from the beginning in the third year. The dominant story is the story of sovereign democracy, resisting the revision of the authoritarian Russian state, trying to regain the lost magnificence of the previous empire. The crisis, which may have been included, has been changed to long -term war, and has a fatal result of Ukraine and corrosion effects on European cohesion. As conflicts are attracted, it is a harmony of ideological inertia, strategic deficit and political avoidance.
The question was whether Ukraine had the right to choose an alliance. The actual problem was whether the West could exercise, secure, and maintain its rights without causing the war that the West could not enter or bring a decisive end. In early 2022, Ukraine’s joining NATO was politically impossible and was recognized by Western leaders. However, the discourse of “freedom of choice” continued as if the call of rights could indicate political decisions rather than a realistic evaluation of the situation.
As NOAM CHOMSKY observed correctly, great power is forced to rely on any where their interests require, arousing the rules -based order. The case of the Solomon Islands is as follows. In 2022, when the small Pacific state signed a security contract with China, US officials expressed concern about strategic impacts. The vocabulary did not apply to much more efforts to Ukrainian integration.
Realistic thinkers, from MearSheimer and Walt to Morgenthau and Kissinger, have long warned that power ultimately determines national action. But the belief that liberal democracy should be expanded worldwide and be welcomed by all rational actors, the liberal hegemony project was dominant. The war was reduced to a binary framework of good and evil, deliberately side of the balance of history, geopolitical and power.
The opposition was a witty painting and diplomacy was pushed into a margin. From the war before the war to the Istanbul dialogue in the spring of 2022, the initial opportunities were prepared separately in favor of the belief that the maximum pressure and Russia could be permanently weakened. A more flexible approach, including serious participation in the Ukrainian neutral or conditional security guarantee, may have opened a space for escalation. Instead, the war became a waiting pattern and lacked a consistent plan. Conflicts have been extended through story consistency rather than strategic design. But international politics is not a court. It is a field of debate that the principle must coexist with power and prudence. The idea that wars can occur in Europe without strategic reorganization, escalation incentives, or serious participation with the enemy constitutes a profound failure of diplomacy.
This criticism does not resolve Russia. The invasion was the shameless violation and cruel acts of international law. However, European decisions were not based on structured strategies based on actual conditions, and were not adjusted as the situation evolved, which was an important weakness. European leaders assumed that structural constraints could be dismissed and the US political attitude would not change. Trump’s possibility of return was treated as an investigative guess, not a scenario that guarantees a widely recognized plan. When this scenario was embodied, Europe responded to shock because Trump’s position was not known, but strategic strategic gods.
As 2025 develops, European leaders are re -correcting the approach, but even these adjustments maintain traces of fantasy. The European landscape is getting more and more confused because the United States no longer provides an empty check. Starmer’s phrase “ground boots, air plane” can project a decision, but the UK or France do not have the ability to form development. Investigative trust still remains, but the designated foundation is profoundly questionable. Europe is eager for lions but has no claws.
Even if peace cannot be denied, Europe faces unresolved dilemma. The perception of Russia has prevailed as a permanent and existential threat to European security. However, if you handle it in all areas, there is a risk of strengthening and distorting the architecture of postwar security.
At a deeper level, the Ukrainian war has become a mirror that reveals the internal contradictions of Europe. The continent is struggling to express a consistent strategic response by national approaches such as anxiety of Baltic countries, reluctance to the southern, Franco-British competition, and asymmetrical economic benefits. In this fragmentary designated environmental environment, the formalization and endurance of integrated policy appear to be uncertain. In the name of the right to choose the Ukrainian allies, the so -called “union of will” will be a path to the executable solution according to all accounts. The presence of NATO forces in the Ukrainian soil constantly consists of Russia’s red lines, and Moscow has no incentives to accept it, taking into account the development of the battlefield.
At the same time, the potential expansion of this model for Europe’s defense can cause deeper cracks within the EU. In particular, if it is associated with Turkey’s participation, it is a scenario that can face opposition from countries such as Greece and Cyprus, considering tension with Ankara, which is considered a direct strategic threat. This sculpture is not simply institutional. It reflects deeper failure of vision and adjustment.
Steve Witkoff Recently mentionedThe precondition required to end the war is to clearly define the ultimate goal. You can form a means to know where you want to go. It is also necessary to understand the desire of all the parties involved to reach the solution that everyone can live together. But this solution is still far away. The question is how much destruction will be in front of you, and if you do not have calm judgment and goodwill, new risks can occur. In Europe, the actual test is not only how the war ends, but also what kind of order it comes after that, and whether the lessons of this war can finally cause strategic maturity.
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