Maputo, Mozambique, February 03 (IPS) -No Fantasy: Mozambique is in crisis despite Daniel Chapo’s inauguration despite the establishment of the president and new parliament. In the October 9, 2024 elections, a wide range of charges of large -scale election fraud were immediate induction of anxiety, but the protests severely showed socioeconomic and political dissatisfaction.
There is a significant frustration against the reduced living expenses, inequality, continuous unemployment and quality public service. A task that defines the development path of Mozambique for the past decade. This socioeconomic pressure especially caused feelings of alienation and despair among many people struggling to meet young people.
The protests led by the officially recognized Benchncio Mondlane in the presidential election, especially among young people, quickly gained momentum. The protesters explicitly rejected the election results, expressed their complaints about the 49 -year rules of Frel Remo, and ended the description of the failed governance model that permanently ford economic and political exclusion.
More than three months of protest has been passed. The tolls of deaths surpassed 300, more than 600 people were injured, and many were good at without access. Both public and private infrastructure have suffered extensive damage. But the deadlock continues. Attempts to talk failed, and the state was in uncertainty.
Two presidents, one split country
Mozambique is now facing an unprecedented challenge of two claimants for the presidential position. The two inauguration are darkened by violence and reflect the wider trend of how opposition is managed in this country.
The long history of developing his political agenda using Prreli Mock National Security Forces is clear in a consistent and cruel response to the police’s protests. The tear gas, living bullets and even family invasion have caused the death and injuries of civilians who have not invaded.
The use of this excessive force was not revealed by CHAPO, his predecessor Filipe Nyusi and senior police officers.
But violence is not unilateral. The protesters were engaged in interruption and even attacked the police station, causing the death of the police officer. In some areas, protesters reach DECThey will completely replace the polícia da república de Moçambique (PRM). It further eroses the authority of the official security device to form its own police.
Mondlane, who added fuel to the fire, recently announced a controversial retaliation doctrine. Police officers will be killed in return for every protest murdered by the police. ‘Eyes’.
In a challenging bid to weaken the author’s authority, Mondlane accepted the shadow governance model. He issued what he called the President’s Law and demanded civil disobedience, including the demand for tolls and prices for prices for prices of essential products such as water, energy and cement.
His populist measures chose with many supporters. But their execution is often protested and sometimes violent.
Meanwhile, Chapo’s administration, which is still struggling to form the government, has not yet dealt with the crisis. In recent development, FreLimo’s senior figure, ANA RITA SITHOLE, dismissed the possibility of political consensus with Mondlane, extending the prospect that the camp in the party would not participate in the conversation and not undermining the potential customers. To restore peace. This hard line intensifies political divisions and throws shadows in Mozambique’s already broken future.
Escalation and authoritarianism or stability and conversation?
The uncertain future of Mozambique is dominated by escalation, and the other is dominated by return to reconciliation and stability. The possibility of dialogue is a decisive factor that separates these two trajectors. But progress has been disappointingly limited to fostering such conversations.
In the first scenario, instability deepens as both sides firm their position. In this scenario, Mondlane continues to rectify citizen disobedience, protests and mass mobilization, furthering the ability to effectively rule Chapo. The pressure faced by the pressurization can follow the oppressive path of the predecessor NYUSI, and the control rights can be insisted on the police crackdown and the national security bureau.
Such measures can be aimed at restoring order, but there is no more tension. All oppression can cause more powerful resistance from opposition supporters, which can potentially expand dangerous violence and anxiety.
Political persecution can be strengthened to target opposition figures, journalists and sportsmen. In extreme scenarios, this can cause more anger and deepen social divisions among supporters because of the assassination or imprisonment of major opposition leaders like Mondein himself.
This trajectory is new and not unique. The other countries faced the crisis after the election traveled a similar path where oppression and authoritarianism increased. Since the 2008 elections, Zimbabwe has been Ethiopia since 2005, Venezuela in 2018, and Russia in 2011. Such measures can provide short -term control, but ultimately turned out to be impossible, causing long -term instability or deeper authoritarian rules.
Mozambique is now facing similar dangers, and the police’s cruelty of the protesters has reached an incredible level and an unacceptable level. This strengthening of oppression emphasizes urgent need for new inclusive and less military approaches to solve the crisis.
Second, a more optimistic scenario depends on the conversation. True participation among major social stakeholders, including Chapo, Mondlane and Civil Society, religious leaders and scholars, was able to relieve tension and restore trust in governance.
Unfortunately, the effort to begin conversation has been faced with practical frustration. Former President NYUSI attempted initial attempts by inviting Mondlane to the table, but the latter prerequisites (mainly prerequisites related to safety) were not resolved and caused absent from the dialogue.
Subsequent discussions include representatives of several opposition parties, including Chapo and Ossufo Momade (Renamo), Lutero Simango (MDM) and Albino forquilha.Surrender) And salomão muchanga (Nova democracy) However, the continuous absence of Mondlane limited their scope and effect.
At the beginning of this month, when Mond Lane eventually returned to Mozambique, there was a speculation on meetings with other opposition leaders, but this conversation was never realized. In his first speech, Chapo himself emphasizes the necessity of ‘honest, honest, and sincere’ conversation and is called priority of political and social stability.
However, almost two weeks after the office assumed, there was no report on the actual dialogue initiative, and CHAPO publicly rejected the existence of ongoing negotiations.
In order for this scenario to succeed, as a Republic President, Chapo must take a decisive behavior and use his leadership to establish an agreement on the interests of the state. At the same time, Mondlane must show the openness of the negotiated solutions to the dispute and reconsider his list of requests. In particular, after the Constitutional Court deals with dissatisfaction and officially determines the final results, his fight against the truth seems difficult to win.
Mozambique’s current deadlock reflects the tensions of the 2009 elections. I am reluctant to participate in such a meaningful conversation. Unfortunately, the early trouble eventually reached the armed confrontation between the largest opposition party, Renamo and Frel Rimo government.
In order to prevent history from repeating history, leaders must do more than to create symbolic gestures. The situation requires a true comprehensive participation of the opposition leaders and civil society, which amplifies the voices of everyone. Only by replacing firm divisions with serious dialogue, the country can work for a stable and democratic future, away from the cycle of conflict.
Egídio Chaimite He is a senior researcher at Mozambique’s IESE, specializing in governance, elections, human rights and social movements. Through extensive publications and experiences on program design, implementation and evaluation, he teaches election management and public policy at the best university in Mozambique.
source: International Politics and Society (IPS), Friedrich-Ebert-Stifftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin’s Global and European Policy Department.
IPS Un Bureau
© Inter Press Service (2025) -Lee all rightsSource: Inter Press Service
