Even before President Vladimir Putin arrived in Beijing last month to strengthen Russia’s ‘unfettered’ partnership with China, Western media began doubling down on the widely shared notion that the war in Ukraine was just that. It brought Beijing and Moscow closer together.. While not unfounded, such casual observations obscure geopolitical complexity and an incomplete understanding of China’s strategic views, as well as subtle but important recent changes in the Sino-Russian partnership. Because not only have the forces of balance in this relationship shifted more in China’s favor, but the deep-rooted flaws in the relationship have also come to the fore. A look at the evolving politics of memory in both countries shows that China, the newly emerged senior partner, is currently pursuing a markedly different policy agenda than Moscow’s junior partner.
May is a month rich in historical symbols in Russia. On May 9, President Vladimir Putin oversaw the 79th anniversary military parade in Moscow, marking the first inauguration of his new six-year term as President of the Russian Federation.Day It is a day to commemorate the country’s victory in the war known as the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. His address As in previous years, he paid tribute to the fallen heroes and veterans of the former Soviet Union who liberated Europe from Nazism and condemned Western attempts to distort this historical ‘truth’. Putin also praised the contributions of other allied countries, although contrary to what he explicitly said last year: recognize He emphasized the contributions of the United States and Britain, this time citing the courage of the Chinese people in resisting China and militaristic Japan.
A week later, Putin arrived in Beijing for his first state call as the newly elected leader. to interview The day before his visit, President Putin spoke highly of the cooperation between the two countries during World War II and emphasized China’s contribution to the victory of the Allied Forces through Chinese state media. The Russian president even claimed that ‘it was China that stopped the main forces of Japanese militarists, allowing the Soviet Union to focus on defeating Nazism in Europe.’ To a Chinese audience, this may not seem strange because it fits perfectly with the situation in Beijing. We recently revamped our official reading. Part of World War II history. But from a Russian perspective, this is a surprising concession that represents a major shift in Moscow’s position. usual story The Soviet Union deserves major credit for defeating the Empire of Japan as well as Nazi Germany.
This shift in Moscow’s rhetoric about the Great Patriotic War and the contributions of its former allies shows two things. First, Moscow abandoned its efforts. continued Until last year – reaching out to the US to revive the ‘spirit’ of cooperation from our shared past. This is very clear from this year’s Victory Day speech where President Putin condemned the policies of the ‘Western elite’ as ‘promoting regional conflicts, inter-ethnic and inter-religious strife and blockading centers of sovereignty and independence’. of global development.’ Second, the changed rhetoric means acknowledging Moscow’s part in the changing balance in its relations with its key ‘comrades-in-arms’ then and today. Not long ago, on the surface, China was ‘Junior Partner’ Putin’s surprising statement in Moscow’s World War II discourse confirms that the roles have now changed.
However, while President Putin shifted to a militant and anti-Western policy of memory politics, he took the opposite stance. Friend Xi Jinping. As the trend of China and Moscow jointly commemorating the war increased for several consecutive years starting in 2015, the Chinese leadership suddenly changed course in 2022. After refusing to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, China has since adjusted its memory strategy, shifting focus from World War II to contemporary crisis response and peace-building efforts. subtly separated Historical discourse in Moscow. A notable sign is that, unlike previous years, no prominent Chinese leaders were present at Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in 2023 and 2024.
A second clue that China is careful not to escalate tensions with the West was provided by Xi’s state visit to Serbia this month. In what is widely seen as a highly symbolic move, the Chinese leader arrived in Belgrade on May 7. This was exactly 25 years after an American stealth bomber dropped five satellite-guided precision bombs on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and wounding 20 diplomats. . During a 2016 state visit to Serbia, one of China and Russia’s main European allies, President Xi pay homage To the three Chinese people who were martyred at the bombing site Some people believe This was a deliberate CIA attack on the Chinese embassy, and Beijing recently ‘barbaric atrocity.’ However, this time, President Xi surprised many people by refraining from visiting the site. to avoid escalating tensions with the united states
The third sign that Beijing’s memory politics is geared toward improving relations with the United States is China’s recent ‘storm’.human exchangeWith the families and friends of American heroes who served in China during World War II. Last summer, Xi Jinping wrote a friendly letter to the Chinese government. Descendants of U.S. Army General Joseph StilwellWho is it? remember fondly in China today for his courage as commander of the China-Burma-India Campaign. Surviving member of the American Volunteer Corps, also known as the ‘Flying Tigers’ who assisted the Chinese Air Force against the Japanese invasion. More than 2,000 Soviet pilots assisted the Chinese in the early stages of the war. lack of attention Chinese state media continues to praise these American war heroes as noble examples of “enduring China-US friendship.”
These recent trends in historical statecraft reveal key differences between the worldviews and strategic intentions of Russia and China. Just like me and Eric S. Zhang Recently displayed Studies of World War II memory have shown that Russian official discourse tends to be characterized by strong universalization and ideological overtones that tend to arouse principled external opposition, while Chinese historical narratives tend to be regional or specific. They are formed more flexibly around local, temporary and pragmatic policy goals. Problem area. While Moscow is increasingly clinging desperately to a selective reading of the past, China appears rather focused on completing a pragmatic, proactive and forward-looking agenda. This does not deny the existence of shared values and strategic goals, but rather exposes the less obvious differences and weak ideological foundations of the friendship the two profess.
The combination of China’s emergence as a senior partner in relations with Russia and the Chinese leadership’s intention to improve relations with the US-led West may be good news. If Beijing really thinks so Essential to avoid conflict Improving relations with the United States will require continuing to defuse potential memory wars with the West, such as those used by Moscow to justify its attacks in Europe. It triggers and sustains actual armed conflict.. We must proceed very carefully with the plans announced last week. joint statement to celebrate 80Day They decided to commemorate the anniversary of the victory in World War II in 2025 together with Russia and to ‘jointly promote a correct historical perspective’ on the war. A smarter approach would be to continue on the path chosen in 2022, towards memory diversification and reduction.
Meanwhile, if Washington is serious about his desire toTruly stabilizing, improving and moving forward.‘Relations with Beijing must look at the current state of Sino-Russian relations: as well as a window of opportunity.’thaw‘It not only eases bilateral tensions with Beijing, but also ensures that the latter has an alternative to slipping deeper into Moscow’s embrace. This does not mean that the West should try to drive a wedge between China and Russia, something Xi will not allow and is likely to be counterproductive anyway. Rather, the United States should refrain from using measures, sanctions, and threats that may have strong bipartisan support but ultimately serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy by escalating tensions and pushing China deeper into Moscow’s embrace. with us presidential election It is approaching, but it is doubtful whether a prudent policy will be developed at least by the end of the year. The question is whether the current window of opportunity is still open.
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